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Evidence for Hope? Assessing the Role of the UN Human Rights 
Council Special Rapporteurs on the Course of the Palestinian 
Question       
Gonca Oğuz Gök*  
 
 
“I felt that the Palestinians deserved and needed an independent voice  
within the UN system and that the UN, for all of its shortcomings,  
has become a politically relevant arbiter of the legitimacy and illegitimacy of  
competing claims of right in conflicts that are brought to its attention”  
(Richard Falk, 2015) 
 
 
 
Abstract  
 
The Palestinian Question has been at the heart of the United Nations (UN) since its 
establishment. Yet, the “intergovernmental” mechanisms of the world organization 
have proven to be largely ineffective in finding a just and sustainable solution to one of 
the most important and intractable issues of the UN-era. In between political and 
diplomatic struggles, the UN Human Rights Council Special Rapporteurs on Palestine 
are increasingly regarded as the only truly independent and expert voices as well as 
valuable sources of information regarding the issue. However, the special rapporteurs 
are one of the least studied aspects of the UN regarding the Palestinian question. 
Drawing highly on the social constructivist premise on the role of ideas and norms in 
constructing/deconstructing the legitimacy discourse in international politics, this study 
attempts to theoretically question and empirically analyse how the “actorness” of the 
special rapporteurs have the potential to affect the course of the Palestinian question. 
The article concludes that the mobilization of normative arguments on the Palestinian 
Question at the transnational level and framing the issue for collective debate supported 
by technical and knowledge-based legal expertise of UN Special Rapporteurs may 
confer a renewed legitimizing role for the United Nations.   
 
 
Keywords: Palestinian Question; United Nations; Human Rights Council; Special 
Rapporteurs; Legitimization 
 
Introduction    
 
The Palestinian Question has been at the centre of United Nations (UN) agenda since the 
British transfer of responsibility as a mandatory power in Palestine from the League of 
Nations to the UN in 1945. Since then the UN has been given the historical responsibility of 
finding a just and peaceful solution to the question. As of yet, the world organization is home 
to the political and diplomatic struggle between the generally pro-Palestinian consensus of 
the international community of the UN General Assembly resolutions and the so-called 
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power politics at the heart of UN Security Council veto mechanism (Falk 2018).
1
 Among 
others, the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) in Geneva, formerly known as the UN 
Commission of Human Rights (CHR), has become one of the few arenas within the UN in 
which different and competing viewpoints from various actors still prevail regarding the 
Palestinian question. As an inter-governmental body with various structural and procedural 
limitations, the role of the HRC has so far had little political traction in pushing for a just and 
peaceful solution to the Palestinian question (Falk 2017).  
In between the aforementioned internal UN struggles; a mechanism called the UN 
Human Rights Council Special Procedures, especially the work of the special rapporteur on 
Palestine in particular, as well as the staff support of the Office of Human Rights High 
Commissioner (OHRHC) are increasingly valuable sources of information regarding the 
Palestinian question. The Special Rapporteur on Palestine is often regarded as the only truly 
independent and expert voice available to the Palestinian people and thus the Human Rights 
Council utilizes the work of the rapporteurs as part of its Universal Periodic Review (UPR) 
process and as a contribution to its special sessions. The work of the rapporteurs is also cited 
during Human Rights Council debates by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil 
society actors (Smith 2011: 180). Their status as independent experts is at the heart of their 
perceived legitimacy which in turn puts them in a position of authority regarding the human 
rights dimension of the Palestinian question. Despite this, the special rapporteurs are one of 
the least studied aspects of the United Nations system of protecting human rights in general 
and regarding the Palestinian question in particular. 
Acknowledging the social constructivist premise that technical expertise, mobilization 
of information, and diffusion and fixing of meanings are important sources of International 
Organizations‟ (IO) power and authority in international politics (Barnett & Finnemore 
2004), this article attempts to theoretically question and empirically analyse how the 
actorness of the special rapporteurs have the potential to affect the course of the Palestinian 
question. In order to answer this, the article will first comparatively and theoretically analyse 
the role and actorness of the UN Human Rights Council with that of its special procedures 
mechanism in terms of its strengths and limitations regarding the institutionalization and 
implementation of international human rights norms. Secondly, the article will specifically 
focus on the role of the UN Human Rights Council Special Rapporteurs on the Palestinian 
question. Drawing highly on the social constructivist premise on the role of ideas, norms, 
knowledge, and argument (Finnemore & Sikking 2001: 392) in constructing/deconstructing 
the legitimacy discourse in international politics, this study attempts to understand the role of 
UN Special Procedures mechanism in general and to the Special Rapporteurs on the 
Palestinian question in particular.  
 
Assessing the Role of the UN Human Rights Council: Old Wine in a New Bottle? 
 
Following World War II, human rights have become a so-called “legitimate” field of focus at 
the UN. The creation of the UN in 1945 was the first step towards increased placement of 
value on human rights. Soon after in 1946, the UN created a sub-body to deal with the 
promotion of human rights. The Human Rights Commission (HRC) was the first international 
organization mandated to deal specifically with international human rights. The Commission 
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achieved numerous successes in the early years of its establishment such as the preliminary 
drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1947 which was notable for the fact 
that so-called Third World states from Latin America and Asia were also able to be active 
along with powerful Western states in the drafting of Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
at the UN Human Rights Commission (Waltz 2001: 54).   
After its establishment, the UN Commission of Human Rights (CHR) received a large 
number of individual petitions complaining about a range of allegations on human rights 
violations in several member states. Very early, the commission announced that it had no 
power to take any action in response to charges by individuals of human rights violations by 
governments. In the early days of the UN, the CHR focused solely on elaborating human 
rights standards. In this regard, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) passed a 
resolution in 1947 that the Commission had “no power to take any action in regard to any 
complaints concerning human rights”.2   
With the wave of decolonization in the early 1960s, numerous new member states were 
admitted to the UN at the General Assembly, bringing new priorities to the Council. Small 
states from the Third World applied to the UN in their struggle for self-determination and 
thus the platform has become one to which competing legitimacy claims of new emerging 
norms on human rights are taken. Drawing from the social constructivist perspective, Neta C. 
Crawford (2002) argues that ethical arguments, especially those regarding human equality 
and the rule of law, have played the most important role in the decolonization process in the 
UN platform by gradually undermining the legitimacy of existing colonial practices. 
Moreover, criticisms of apartheid and racism were also brought to the CHR during the 1960s. 
Accordingly, in 1965, the CHR was faced with a number of individual petitions from South 
Africa and came under considerable pressure to deal with them.
3
 One should note here that 
among others, the struggles against apartheid functioned as a catalyst which led to CHR 
Resolution 125(XLII) on June 1967, creating the possibility of holding a public debate on 
violations of human rights in all countries (Pinheiro 2011: 162-163). In other words, in 1967, 
the CHR was empowered to investigate human rights practices in individual states without 
their permission and struggle for human rights challenged the very sovereignty principle as 
well as creating space for institutional change at the UN. Furthermore, focusing initially on 
the standard-setting during the first 20 years of its existence, step by step the implementation 
of these standards became the second focal point of the work of the CHR (Freedman 2011: 
26).
4
  
Although these developments could be regarded as the evolution of the CHR as well as 
its institutional change, the real progress or effectiveness of the institution is debated. Many 
criticisms have been levelled at the CHR‟s structure throughout the years. It was first 
criticized based on membership criteria as human rights abuser states could serve as members 
of the Commission. Secondly, powerful states have been able to avoid scrutiny due to the 
difficulty in holding them accountable for human rights abuses (Freedman 2013). Some of 
the major criticisms towards the CHR encompassed membership of known abuser states, 
naming and shaming of countries through country-specific resolutions, absence of 
membership criteria, etc. (Redondo 2008). Additionally, Israel has argued that it has been 
denied membership in the Asian Group by its Arab members and that the Commission has 
increasingly evolved towards a biased slant against Israel
5
 (Freedman 2011: 26). 
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Nevertheless, the UN Commission of Human Rights has been noteworthy through its drafting 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and its role during the struggle for 
decolonization and the anti-apartheid movement.   
In 2005, referring to the criticisms regarding membership and effectiveness at the UN 
World Summit, the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan recommended that the 
Commission be replaced with a smaller and more effective Council (Moss 2010: 125). 
Accordingly, the General Assembly decided to reform the Commission in March 2006 and 
the newly created institution was renamed the Human Rights Council (HRC). The HRC was 
to report directly to the General Assembly and to be composed of 47 member states 
responsible for strengthening, promoting, and protecting human rights around the globe. It 
was therefore established by the General Assembly, not the ECOSOC, and serves as a 
subsidiary body of the GA. Interestingly, the HRC is the only body in the UN platform in 
which the number of members decreased through reforms (from 53 to 47).
6
 The Council was 
mandated to assume the Commission‟s standard-setting role which includes recommending 
that the General Assembly adopt human rights norms. The Council is given the power to 
undertake certain supervisory roles, such as monitoring state compliance with human rights. 
A new mechanism called “Universal Periodic Review” was also introduced. Furthermore, the 
Council was empowered to suspend member states as a direct response to the criticism that 
known abuser states held Commission membership. Finally, the Council is mandated to work 
within the wider UN system and with civil society actors to protect and promote human rights 
(Freedman 2011:106-109).  
Despite these structural reforms, the Council‟s effectiveness in protecting human rights 
has continued to be limited. Despite the fact that the Council has issued a significantly greater 
number of resolutions than to the Commission (30 in 2006 versus more than 150 in 2018),
7
  
critics argue that since its creation, the vast majority of the Council‟s time and attention has 
been focused on general thematic issues rather than country-specific mandates
8
 (Gujadhur & 
Lamarque 2015). Some have also pointed to the fact that while the Council has responded to 
violations of human rights, it has been notably selective in terms of the limited range of 
situations addressed (Freedman 2011). On the other hand, compared to other organs of the 
UN, the Council remains one of the few mechanisms in which developed Western states 
remain outnumbered by developing non-Western countries. Secondly, the Council is 
mandated to work within the wider UN system and with civil society actors to protect and 
promote human rights. Therefore, the body has the power to share information with, and 
receive information from, those actors (Jordaan 2015: 465). Above all, HRC fact-finding 
missions and special procedures, the work of the special rapporteurs, have become one of the 
most crucial mechanisms in the 2000s in terms of contributing to the work of the HRC on 
human rights.  
 
The Role of the UN Human Rights Council on the Palestinian Question 
 
At the end of World War I, Palestine was one of several former Ottoman Arab territories 
which became mandated territories by the League of Nations. After World War II, Britain 
transferred responsibility to the UN which took up the question of Palestine in February 
1947. The UN proposed terminating the mandate rule and partitioning Palestine into two 
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independent states, one Palestinian Arab and one Jewish, with Jerusalem internationalized.
9
  
One of the two states proclaimed its independence as Israel and following a two-year armed 
conflict; over half of the Palestinian Arab population fled or were expelled. The result of the 
1967 War was Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including East 
Jerusalem, creating a second wave of forced Palestinian immigrants numbering at 
approximately half a million.
10
   
The United Nations Human Rights Council specifically took up the issue of human 
rights in the Palestine question after the 1967 War. Initially, the Security Council Resolution 
242 formulated the principles of a just and lasting peace, including an Israeli withdrawal from 
the territories occupied during the conflict and a just settlement of the refugee problem.  
Resolution 237, adopted in August 1967, called on Israel to allow the return of refugees and 
to observe international conventions governing the treatment of civilians in times of war. In 
1968, the General Assembly reasserted the right of refugees to return to their homes and 
established the “Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human 
Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories”.11  
The UN Commission on Human Rights issued its first resolution in 1968, titled 
“Human Rights Situation in the Occupied Territory”. In fact, after 1967, one can observe a 
fundamental transformation in the evolution of the Palestine question at the HRC. The issue 
evolved from being viewed as a refugee problem to be recognized as an important issue 
involving the fundamental rights of the Palestinian people to return to their homeland and to 
national self-determination.
12
 The systemic effects of normative developments regarding 
human rights in late 1960s also contributed to this renewed conceptualization towards the 
Palestinian question. In parallel, the UN General Assembly established the Committee on the 
Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People in 1975 and conferred on the 
PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization) the status of observer in the Assembly and in UN 
conferences.
13
  
When examining the UN Commission of Human Rights resolutions throughout years, 
particularly after the 2000s, there has been a notable qualitative and quantitative change 
regarding the Palestinian question both in terms of the number and the subject matter. As 
Table 1 illustrates, HRC resolutions were limited both in the number and scope during the 
first decade of its establishment, namely between 1968 and 1978. In fact, until 1993, a total of 
13 resolutions were issued with respect to human rights and 3 on self-determination and 
Israeli Settlements (see Table 1).  
1993 marked a turning point in which the CHR decided to appoint its first special 
rapporteur with a mandate to investigate human rights violations until the end of the Israeli 
occupation of territories occupied since 1969.
14
 As seen in Table 1, the number of resolutions 
regarding the human rights situation in Palestine almost tripled from 11 to 28 between 1994 
and 2000. The Council could therefore be viewed to begin to perceive the Palestinian 
question from a human rights perspective after the Cold War. Similarly, greater attention was 
paid to the expansion of Israeli settlements in the Council following the Cold War. The 
Middle East Peace Process gained a new agenda during the 1990s. The real surge occurred in 
the 2000s in terms of both the expansion of missions and the growing number of resolutions 
with a widened agenda on the Palestinian question.    
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Table 1: CHR and HRC Resolutions on Palestinian Question
15 
 
 HR RSD MEPP IS HRIC RCR IMO GHR EAJ FFM Total 
1968- 1978 6 2 - - - - - - - - 8 
1982-1993 11 1 - 1 - - - - - - 13 
1994-2000 28 1 7 7 1 - - - - - 44 
2001-2005 18 2 - 4 - - - 1 - - 25 
2006-2010 26 3 - 4 - 2 3 
4 
(FFM) 
- 6 48 
2011-2018 10 6 - 9 - - - - 6 6 37 
Total 99 15 7 25 1 2 3 5 6 12  
 
HR: Human Rights Situation in Occupied Territories; RSD: Right to Self Determination; MEPP: Middle East 
Peace Process; IS: Israeli Settlements; HRIC: Human Rights Inquiry Commission to be Established; (RCR) 
Religious and Cultural Rights; (IMO) Israeli Military Operations; (GHR): Grave Violations of Human Rights; 
(EAJ)Ensuring Accountability and Justice in Occupied Palestinian Territory; (FFM): Reports of Fact-Finding 
Missions.  
 
The 2000s marked the establishment of the HRC‟s fact finding missions to investigate 
violations of human rights, such as the UN fact-finding mission on the Gaza conflict in 2009, 
the UN fact-finding mission on the Gaza flotilla in 2010, and the UN fact-finding mission on 
Israeli settlements in 2012. In addition, the Human Rights Inquiry Commission was 
established in 2000. As seen in Table 1, one can trace an increased number of HRC 
resolutions, especially after the Council‟s establishment in 2006. Furthermore, the new issues 
of religious and cultural rights were added to the Council‟s resolutions. In the last decade in 
particular, ensuring accountability and justice became a growing concern on the Council‟s 
agenda, possibly corresponding to a shift in terms of an increased focus on the issue of 
accountability (see Table 1).   
Therefore, one can trace the evidence of a shifting discourse with respect to the 
Palestinian question in UN Human Rights Council focusing more on issues of accountability 
and justice. Similarly, the Council has begun to highlight the political dimension more than 
the human rights dimension. Furthermore, in June 2007, the United Nations Human Rights 
Council voted in favor of making the human rights situation in Palestine a permanent item on 
the Council‟s agenda, a move that might also be argued to affect the increased number of 
resolutions on the Palestinian question.
16
 On the other hand, as the only permanent council 
agenda item on a specific country and issue, Item 7 on Palestinian issues is highly criticized 
for being biased against Israel.  
Although these numbers illustrate an evolution in the Council‟s growing interest in the 
Palestinian question, apart from the fact-finding missions in the 2000s, its effectiveness in 
creating actual outcomes have so far been largely limited. In fact, the increased number of 
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resolutions and growing agenda has led some to accuse it of being biased against Israel and 
putting disproportionate attention to Israeli violations of human rights as compared with 
countries that are worse offenders. On the other hand, as Richard Falk puts it, these criticisms 
sometimes focus more on the messenger than the message itself. Yet, as an inter-
governmental body, the Council‟s resolutions have so far proven to have limited political 
traction in changing the established discourse, mobilizing different humanitarian actors in 
global governance, and persuading and pressuring governments to enact a just and peaceful 
solution to the Palestinian question.  Nevertheless, despite criticisms towards its effectiveness 
in realizing its purpose, it is still one of the few institutional arenas in which both Western 
and non-Western priorities still prevail on the Palestinian question.   
More importantly, the work of the HRC has been supported from various mechanisms 
including civil society actors, fact-finding missions, and special procedures. In this regard, 
the work of the special rapporteurs, more generally known as the Special Procedures, 
supported by the Special Procedures Branch (SPB) of the Office of the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights (OHCHR) have been more important than the Council, which is composed 
of governments. Having said that, the remainder of this article will theoretically analyze the 
actorness of the other mechanism established under Human Rights Council, namely the 
Special Procedures and the Special Rapporteurs on Palestine. 
 
The Actorness of the UN Human Rights Special Rapporteurs: A Social Constructivist 
Analysis 
 
Human rights special procedures are regarded as being the strongest protection actors across 
the United Nations Human Rights machinery (Ramcharan 2011). “Special Procedures” is the 
general name given to the mechanisms established by the Commission on Human Rights and 
assumed by the Human Rights Council to address either specific country situations or 
thematic issues in all parts of the world. In fact, the establishment of first special procedures 
goes back to the 1960s, and the struggle against the apartheid regime in South Africa. In 
1965, the Commission on Human Rights was faced with a number of individual petitions 
from South Africa and came under considerable pressure to deal with them. As a result, in 
1967, the Commission departed from previous practice and established an ad-hoc working 
group of experts to investigate the situation of human rights in Southern Africa. This ad-hoc 
working group can be considered the first Special Procedure of the Commission on Human 
Rights.
17
 Yet officially, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (CHR) only 
appointed its first special rapporteur with a country mandate in 1979 to report on human 
rights abuses in Chile under the Augusto Pinochet dictatorship (Pinherio 2011: 162-163). 
Subsequent country-specific human rights-related appointments were in El Salvador, 
Equatorial Guinea, Bolivia, and Guatemala in the early 1980s and slightly later, in 1984, in 
Afghanistan and Iran (Subedi 2011: 207).   
Special Procedures either refers to an individual, a special rapporteur, or an 
independent expert/working group. They are prominent, independent experts working on a 
voluntary basis and appointed by the Human Rights Council.
18
 They issue reports to the HRC 
on their findings and recommendations as well as to the General Assembly. They sometimes 
emerge as the only mechanism that has the ability to alert the international community to 
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certain human rights issues, as they can address situations in all parts of the world without the 
requirement for countries to ratify a human rights instrument. The Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) supports the work of rapporteurs, independent 
experts, and working groups through its Special Procedures Branch (SPB), which provides 
centralized support to the special procedures as a system.
19
 Special procedure mandate 
holders gather and publish information about gross violation of human rights and issue 
recommendations (Ramcharan 2011). In practice, the special rapporteurs perform a 
supervisory, consultative, advisory, or monitoring function rather than one of enforcement. In 
other words, they are not legally binding on states (Subedi 2011: 203). Special procedures 
serve as the main entry point into this system for victims and human rights defenders where 
they can voice their experiences, concerns, and expectations. However, there is limited 
scholarly and theoretical examination of the nature and impact of the role of the special 
rapporteur in the normative evolution of international human rights norms (Subedi, Wheatley, 
Mukherjee & Ngane 2011: 155).   
Their actorness differs from that of the Human Rights Council in the sense that UN 
special rapporteurs for human rights have played an important role in monitoring and fact-
finding missions on human rights and in performing a critical role in shaping the content of 
human rights norms. In the words of the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, they are 
“the crown jewel of the system” (Piccone 2011: 207). They have been credited for bringing 
the human rights work of the UN to the ordinary men and women of the globe (Subedi, 
Wheatley, Mukherjee & Ngane 2011: 155). The HRC uses the work of rapporteurs both as 
part of its universal periodic review and as a contribution to its special sessions. The work of 
rapporteurs is also increasingly cited within Council debates by NGOs and civil society, 
states, and treaty monitoring bodies (Smith 2011: 180). Furthermore, the main reference 
points for special procedures‟ examination of a state‟s human rights record range broadly 
from the general provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other widely 
accepted human rights standards. In this regard, they have several important advantages over 
treaty bodies in that “they are not restricted to the text of any one convention; they may 
examine any UN member state, not just those states that have ratified a treaty” (Piccone 
2011: 209).   
The question is then, where do they derive their authority and actorness? Experts 
appointed by the HRC to serve as special procedures are independent of governments, serve 
in their personal capacities, and carry out their mandates on a volunteer basis. Their authority 
is largely derived from their professional qualifications to address specific human rights 
situations objectively as well as the political mandate they receive from the UN Human 
Rights Council. One of their greatest assets is a sense of passion and commitment to the 
cause of human rights which, combined with subject matter expertise, creates a kind of 
legitimacy and authority for calling attention and promoting action to protect human rights. 
Increasingly they have been viewed by civil society, the media, and by many governments as 
a reliable and even authoritative source of useful information, helpful analysis, and policy 
guidance (Falk 2017). In this regard, special rapporteurs exercise power not through coercion 
but through mobilization of information. Officials in international organizations such as the 
UN often insist that part of their mission is to spread, inculcate, and enforce global values and 
norms (Barnett & Finnemore 1999: 708). Therefore borrowing from Weber, as Social 
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Constructivists would argue, they look like rational-legal authorities, in which the source of 
their authority largely derived from their perceived impartiality as well as legal-technical 
expertise on human rights issues (Barnett & Finnemore 2004). They are powerful precisely 
because they are able to affectively create the appearance of de-politicization and ideological 
neutrality/objectivity.  
As Barnett and Finnemore (1999: 708) argues, the IO authority is highly dependent 
upon being perceived as impersonal, technocratic, and neutral an in not exercising power but 
serving others and the presentation and acceptance of these claims is critical to their 
legitimacy and authority. There are considerable amounts of constructivist studies on the role 
of epistemic communities
20
 (Haas 1992) on the social construction of reality (Finnemore & 
Sikking 2001). For instance, Ratner‟s (2000) study of the OSCE‟s High Commissioner for 
Minorities placed the High Commissioner (HC) in a unique position to construct new 
international norms and rules. In this study, lawyers have been shown to do extensive social 
construction again, often in conjunction with international institutions that consolidate and 
formalize the new social facts lawyers create. Burley & Mattli‟s (1993) analysis of the efforts 
of community lawyers to empower the European Court of Justice illustrates the ways in 
which professional groups can translate their own shared understandings into formalized 
organizations and legal structures. From a social constructivist perspective, Kratochwil 
(1989) also examined the role of legal reasoning in persuasion and other social construction 
processes. 
Similarly, the capacity of UN special rapporteurs to mobilize information and build 
technical legal expertise based on perceived impartiality are their main source of power and 
authority on human rights issues. These features confer them a uniquely flexible and 
independent role as well as legitimacy to play in a system otherwise dominated by 
governments. Therefore, for all of its difficulties, the role of special rapporteur is of great 
value as a means of shaping the legitimacy discourse through mobilizing and diffusing 
information. Degrees of effectiveness largely depend on the motivation, background, and 
ability of the individual rapporteur, as well as on the political sensitivity of the mandate. In 
addition, the importance placed on human rights issues rises and falls over time with respect 
to the extent of interest exhibited and as reflected in the wider geopolitical trends (Falk 2017).   
 
The Role of the UN Special Rapporteurs on the Palestinian Question   
 
The UN Human Rights Commission established a mandate in Palestine in 1993 with the 
official name Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Palestinian 
Territories Occupied since 1967.
21
 Unlike other mandates, the mandate on Palestine was 
established to last “until the end of Israeli occupation” (Falk 2017). Accordingly, the 
Commission appointed the first special rapporteur, René Felber, from Switzerland, whose 
task was to assess the situation, work with governments and civil society to collect 
information, report findings publicly, and make recommendations, if necessary.
22
 There have 
since been seven rapporteurs on Palestine, including Felber (see Table 2). However, two 
figures, John Dugard (2001-2008) and Richard Falk (2008-2014) are considered very 
influential in terms of the length of their term of office and their contributions to changing the 
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discourse on the human rights dimension of Palestinian question through mobilizing and 
diffusing information.   
 
Table 2: Special Rapporteurs on the Situation of Human Rights in the Palestinian 
Territories Occupied since 1967 
 
S. Michael Lynk (Canada)  2016-present 
Makarim WIBISONO (Indonesia) 2014-2016  
Richard FALK (USA) 2008-2014 
John DUGARD (South Africa) 2001-2008  
Giorgio GIACOMELLI (Italy) 1999-2001  
Hannu HALINEN (Finland) 1995-1999  
René FELBER (Switzerland) 1993-1995 
 
  
The Work and Actorness of John Dugard as Special Rapporteur for Human Rights on 
Occupied Palestinian Territories (2001-2008) 
 
John Dugard was appointed Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the 
Palestinian Territories in July 2001, a mandate he held until 2008. He became a member of 
the UN‟s International Law Commission in 1997 and served as its Special Rapporteur on 
Diplomatic Protection from 2000 to 2006. He also served as ad hoc Judge in the International 
Court of Justice (2002-8).
23
 Being also a former South African law professor, his reports on 
the violations of human rights in the Palestinian territories consistently upheld a technical 
rule of law approach to the question of Palestine.  
An analysis of his reports demonstrates that one of the recurrent themes in his reports 
during his term was the use of language including occupation, colonialism, and apartheid. 
Dugard raised the issue of whether Israel‟s practices on occupied territories matched the legal 
definition of apartheid in South Africa. In his January 2007 report, his enquiry was as 
follows: 
 
The international community has identified three regimes as inimical to human rights- 
colonialism, apartheid and foreign occupation. Israel is clearly in military occupation of 
the OPT. At the same time, elements of the occupation constitute forms of colonialism 
and of apartheid, which are contrary to international law. What are the legal consequences 
of a regime of prolonged occupation with features of colonialism and apartheid for the 
occupied people, the occupying power and third states?
24 
 
One of the recurrent themes in Dugard‟s reports was also accountability. In his 2007 Report, 
Dugard compared the Palestinian question with that of the apartheid regime in South Africa: 
 
Israel‟s practices and policies in the OPT are frequently likened to those of apartheid 
South Africa… Although the two regimes are different, Israel‟s laws and practices in the 
OPT certainly resemble aspects of apartheid, as shown in paragraphs 49-50 above, and 
probably fall within the scope of the 1973 International Convention on the Suppression 
and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid.
25
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The end of Dugard‟s term coincided with Israel‟s Operation Cast Lead (December 2008-
January 2009), considered one of the most destructive military operations carried out in 
Gaza. John Dugard, along with other experts, was appointed by the Arab League as head of 
a fact-finding mission established in February 2009 with the tasks of investigating and 
reporting on violations of human rights law and international humanitarian law. The report 
concluded that war crimes and crimes against humanity and possibly genocide by individual 
soldiers, as well as war crimes committed by Hamas (Debbas 2010: 249). Dugard‟s Arab 
League report called upon states with domestic international criminal jurisdiction to consider 
the apprehension and prosecution of those responsible for planning and implementing 
Operation Cast Lead (Plessis 2010: 305). One should also mention the Goldstone Report 
written by an ex-judge of the Constitutional Court in South Africa and former Chief UN 
Prosecutor at the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda – 
Richard Goldstone – in 2009. Goldstone was appointed Head of a United Nations Human 
Rights Council fact-finding mission in Gaza. Goldstone‟s 2009 report also found that Israel 
failed to look into alleged misconduct by its soldiers and used white phosphorous in 
violation of international law, the report also calling for greater accountability (Plessis 2010: 
302):   
 
The systematic discrimination, both in law and in practice, against Palestinians, in 
legislation (including the existence of an entirely separate legal and court system which 
offers systematically worse conditions compared with that applicable to Israelis), and 
practice during arrest, detention, trial and sentence compared with Israeli citizens is 
potentially in violation of the prohibition on persecution as a crime against humanity 
(Dugard & Reynolds 2013: 898).  
  
In one of his publications, Dugard argued that states expected the West to respond to the 
Palestinian question in the same way it responded to apartheid; with action through the 
United Nations, governments, and civil society (Dugard 2007).
26
 In an article published in 
the prestigious European Journal of International Law, Dugard concludes that “there are 
indeed strong grounds to conclude that a system of apartheid has developed [over 
Palestinian territories]” (Dugard & Reynolds 2013: 912). According to Dugard & Reynolds 
(2013), the existence of a such regime, amounting to an internationally wrongful act, has 
clear implications under public international law. Dugard argued that “international law may 
retain a role through the light that it shines on the normative issues to be resolved in this 
context” (Dugard & Reynolds 2013: 912).   
The question then is what were the concrete outcomes of Dugard‟s reports or of the 
fact-finding missions such as the Goldstone Report? Gowlland-Debbas (2010) argued that 
Dugard‟s recommendations for referral to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) must have 
played a role in pressuring states to act in 2003. In fact, at the 23rd meeting of its tenth 
emergency special session on 8 December 2003, the General Assembly decided in resolution 
ES-10/14 in accordance with Article 96, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the United Nations, 
to request that the International Court of Justice urgently render an advisory opinion on the 
“legal consequences arising from the construction of the wall being built by Israel”.27 On 9 
July 2004, the International Court of Justice delivered its advisory opinion stating that “all 
State Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention were under the obligation to ensure 
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compliance by Israel with international humanitarian law as embodied in that Convention.”28 
Again, increased reference to accountability on many platforms might also have played a 
role in the HRC‟s resolutions in 2000s which increasingly stress the issue of Ensuring 
Accountability and Justice in Occupied Palestinian Territory (see Table 1). During 
September 2009, lawyers for 16 Palestinians sought to obtain an international arrest warrant 
for the Israeli Defence Minister, Ehud Barak, in a London court over alleged war crimes in 
the Gaza Strip. The accusations against Barak were based, in part, on Goldstone‟s report but 
did not materialize due to his diplomatic immunity from prosecution (Plessis 2010: 307).  
One should note here that the UN has so far not taken any initiatives for enforcing 
these reports calling for accountability. However, even if the UN cannot enforce the reports 
of Dugard and Goldstone, it has the effect of re-enforcing initiatives by individuals and civil 
society organizations, NGOs, and others that feel more empowered to take action to 
implement these dimensions of international law. Hence, it is important to appreciate the 
UN‟s legitimizing role over public discourse.29 As such, Dugard‟s reports on the violations 
of human rights and international humanitarian law have been relied upon as an authoritative 
judgement in various civil society initiatives. Dugard‟s report along with conclusions of 
independent-expert fact-finding missions seems to have legitimised civil society initiatives 
such as the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) initiative.
30
      
 
The Work and Actorness of Richard Falk as Special Rapporteur for Human Rights on 
Occupied Palestinian Territories (2008-2014) 
 
One of today‟s most prominent scholars of International Law, Richard Falk, replaced Dugard 
as the new Special Rapporteur of Human Rights on the Palestinian question. An American 
law professor, Falk‟s reports on the violations of human rights in the Palestinian territories 
consistently upheld a rule of law approach to the question of Palestine. Falk also referred to 
concepts such as apartheid, ethnic cleansing, and occupation in his reports in an effort to 
change the public discourse on the Palestinian question: 
 
In all respects, there is a dual order maintained in the West Bank that is completely 
analogous to the kind of duality one found in apartheid South Africa. It should be 
underscored that according to the Rome Statute (which set up the International Criminal 
Court) apartheid is a crime that does not depend on establishing a resemblance to what 
existed in racist South Africa. It is essentially a discriminatory system of dual law and a 
dual political regulatory system that privileges one part of the society and is punitive 
toward the other.
31
   
 
 In his own words:  
 
Further along this line, by superseding the rhetoric of “occupation” and by viewing the 
Palestinian reality as one of “apartheid”, “ethnic cleansing”, “annexation”, and “settler 
colonialism”, I continued in my reports an effort begun by Dugard to use language that 
more accurately conveyed the true depth of the Palestinian ordeal than the formal 
euphemisms commonly relied upon in diplomatic discourse (Falk 2017: 89).   
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Yet one should note that, during his term and afterwards, Falk chose to place a greater focus 
on two aspects: (1) the contest over legitimacy and (2) non-violent resistance and the role of 
civil society. According to Falk: 
 
The core of the Palestinian struggle has shifted away from both armed resistance and 
international diplomacy, at least temporarily, and that it now centers on various coercive 
forms of nonviolent resistance that are bolstered by growing pro-Palestinian activism in 
global civil society, including within the United State and western Europe. In this regard, 
the BDS (Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions) campaign is emblematic of a legitimacy 
war being waged on many fronts that the Palestinians are winning (Falk 2017: 89).  
 
Accordingly, in his 2012 Report, Falk called on civil society to take measures:  
 
The Special Rapporteur calls on civil society to vigorously pursue initiatives to boycott, 
divest and sanction the businesses highlighted in this report, within their own national 
contexts, until such time as they bring their policies and practices into line with 
international laws and standards, as well as the Global Compact.
32
  
 
Making comparisons with South Africa again, Falk framed the struggle for Palestinian human 
rights as a legitimacy war and placed significant importance on creating a global campaign:   
 
It‟s not that international law is so effective as a way of constraining behavior, but it does 
clarify the limits of acceptable behavior. I think it‟s been very helpful in strengthening the 
civil society Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions campaign … So I think there is a set of 
developments that, in certain ways, resemble what the anti-apartheid campaign in South 
Africa managed to do – which was to create, in its legitimacy war, a global battlefield. 
The campaign was waged globally.
33
  
 
Thus, one should also underline the crucial aspects of growing transnational civil society 
initiatives that have been widely regarded as successful, similar to the campaign in South 
Africa in the late 1980s.
34
 As Dugard argued, the international campaigns of the 1960s on 
decolonization and the anti-apartheid movement of the 1980s supported by the workings of 
normative and ethical arguments in the context of international law represent one of the major 
political success stories of the third world‟s human rights struggle performed at the UN 
platform (Dugard & Reynolds 2013: 913).  
In sum, one of the defining characteristics of the work of Richard Falk was to revert 
attention once again back to world body as the centre of this legitimacy war. In his various 
remarks, Richard Falk upheld the importance of the continued relevance of the United 
Nations on the Palestinian question. Falk himself attributed this point as one of the outcomes 
of his mandate as Special Rapporteur of Human Rights on the Palestinian question:  
 
I was able to formulate this new phase in the Palestinian struggle that included an appeal 
to the UN to be more active as a direct participant in the global solidarity movement (Falk 
2017: 89).   
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Conclusion 
 
Prominent scholar in the field of International Organizations, Inis Claude (1966) wrote as 
early as the 1960s about the role of UN in world politics from a realist perspective. 
According to Claude (1966: 368), world politics is not only a “struggle for power”, but also a 
“contest over legitimacy”. Later, the role of UN was extensively analysed by Social 
Constructivists who underlined that the UN, with its various mechanisms and bureaucracy, is 
not only an instrument in power politics, but also enjoys considerable “rational-legal 
authority” with its ability to mobilize information and more importantly turns “information” 
into “knowledge” (Barnett & Finnemore 2014).  
The “intergovernmental” mechanisms of the UN have proven to be largely ineffective 
in solving one of the most important and intractable issues of the UN-era, the Palestinian 
question. Ample evidence can be found supporting a change in the 2000s with regards to the 
number and content of resolutions issued by the UN Human Rights Council. In this regard, 
tracing the content of the HRC and CHR illustrates that the issue evolved from a refugee 
problem to a human rights issue up until the 2000s. The 2000s marked a change in the 
language towards calling directly and openly to accountability and justice on the Palestinian 
question. In this respect, the work of people like Dugard, Falk, and Goldstone has proven to 
be essential and influential.  
In a world in which “multiple loyalties and overlapping authorities”35 (Bull 1977) 
flourish, these independent law experts at the UN have served as meaning architects in the 
international human rights movements through their impersonal, technocratic, and neutral 
manner. Their knowledge-based expertise on international law has proven to be the main 
source of power. The UN HRC Special Rapporteurs could be conceptualized as “epistemic 
communities” (Haas 1992) specifically in terms of their ability to frame the Palestinian issue 
for collective debate. It reminds the world community that there are other platforms of 
response at the UN than states and that the world organization, despite all limitations, has 
historically proven to be a crucial player in this “contest over legitimacy” (Plessis 2010: 302). 
Whether the diffusion of new ideas and data could lead to new patterns of behavior or 
prove to be an important determinant of international policy coordination on Palestinian issue 
is yet to be seen. In this regard, the decision of some states, including the US, to relocate their 
embassy in Israel to Jerusalem and to recognize the city as the capital of Israel despite UN 
resolutions on the status of Jerusalem since 1945 seem to push the hope for a peaceful and 
sustainable peace to its limits. Although these political moves at the state level appear to 
deepen the Palestinian cries, they also serve to makes it more visible to the international 
audience. In a highly fragmented world with a decreasing faith in democracy, human rights, 
and multilateralism ushering in an increased appeal of authoritarianism, the future of the 
UN‟s legitimization function seems to be more relevant than ever. Human rights issues rise 
and fall over time and it is important to remember that this particular moment in history is not 
an exception, nor it is the worst in history. 
Above all, the mobilization of normative arguments on the Palestinian Question at the 
transnational level and framing the issue for collective debate supported by technical and 
knowledge-based legal expertise of UN HRC Special Rapporteurs may confer a renewed 
legitimizing role in the United Nations. In the words of Richard Falk:  
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In the end, the function of this particular special rapporteur is to lend credibility and 
commitment to the hope for a just and sustainable peace that allows these two peoples to 
live together benevolently (Falk 2017:91).  
 
 
Notes 
 
1. Richard Falk, “The U.S. Withdrawal from the UN Human Rights Council”, Foreign 
Policy Journal, June 22, 2018, (https://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2018/06/22/the-u-
s-withdrawal-from-the-un-human-rights-council/). 
2. ECOSOC Resolution 75 (V) (1947), available at 
(https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages/Introduction.aspx). 
3. See https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages/Introduction.aspx. 
4. Known as the “1503 Procedure”, a confidential complaints procedure open to states, 
NGOs and individuals was established in 1970. According to this, countries could be 
investigated and CHR action could be taken even without national cooperation. From the 
1980s onwards a system of monitoring mechanisms was also developed under the 
auspices of the CHR. 
5. The tone of Israeli criticism towards the HRC increased with the establishment of 
permanent “Item 7” on Palestinian question later in 2000s.  
6. Membership is based on equitable geographical distribution with seats distributed among 
the regional groups as follows: Group of African States, 13; Group of Asian States, 13; 
Group of Eastern European States, 6; Group of Latin American and Caribbean States, 8; 
and Group of Western European and other States, 7. See 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/ohchrreport2011/web_version/ohchr_report2011_web/alle
gati/30_Human_Rights_Council_and_Special_Procedures.pdf. 
7. https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRbodies/HRC/Pages/Home.aspx. 
8. For example, at the 25th session of the Council (March 2014), Turkey delivered a cross- 
regional statement on behalf of 58 states arguing that “the Council‟s program of work has 
reached its limits in terms of its available time”, and that “the increase in numbers and 
length of resolutions may reduce their quality and effectiveness, especially in the absence 
of better implementation”. See Subhas Gujadhur and Toby Lamarque, “Ensuring 
Relevance, Driving Impact: The Evolution and Future direction of the UN Human Rights 
Council‟s Resolution System”, Universal Rights Group Policy Report, January 2015. 
Available at (https://www.universal-rights.org/programmes/human-rights-institutions-
mechanisms-and-processes/the-growth-effectiveness-and-impact-of-human-rights-
council-resolutions/). 
9. Resolution 181 (II) of 1947 
(https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/7F0AF2BD897689B785256C330061D25
3). 
10. https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/D442111E70E417E3802564740045A309. 
11. Ibid.  
12. Ibid.  
13. https://www.un.org/unispal/history/. 
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14. E/CN.4/RES/1993/2 (A+B) (https://www.un.org/unispal/chr-res-on-qop/). 
15. The data used here is obtained from UN Official Database. 
(https://www.un.org/unispal/human-rights-council-resolutions/). 
16. UN Human Rights Council Makes Israel Permanent Agenda Item, available at 
(https://www.haaretz.com/1.4944826). 
17. https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages/Introduction.aspx. 
18. As of 1 August 2017, there are 44 thematic and 12 country mandates. 
(https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/sp/pages/welcomepage.aspx). 
19. https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/HumanRightsBodies.aspx. 
20. Interest in the political effects of experts and specialized knowledge has existed in IR for 
decades. However, a specific research program on the networks of knowledge-based 
experts, conceptualized as “epistemic communities” was introduced by Peter Hass in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s. See Haas, P. (1992). “Introduction: Epistemic communities 
and international policy coordination”. International Organization 46 (1), pp. 1-35. 
21. E/CN.4/RES/1993/2 (A+B) (https://www.un.org/unispal/chr-res-on-qop/). 
22. https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/sp/countriesmandates/ps/pages/srpalestine.aspx. 
23. https://gruber.yale.edu/justice/john-dugard. 
24. A/HRC/4/17, 29 January 2007, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of 
human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, John Dugard 
(https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G07/105/44/PDF/G0710544.pdf?OpenElement).  
25. Ibid.  
26. J. Dugard (2007) “The Future of International Law: A Human Rights Perspective”, 
Universtait Laiden, April 2007 available at: 
(https://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/334367921.pdf). 
27. A/ES-10/PV.23 (8 December 2003). 
28. https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/B59ECB7F4C73BDBC85256EEB004F6D
20. 
29. Interview with Richard Falk, available at 
(https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/189/50404-israelpalestine-
conflict-interview-with-richard-falk.html?itemid=id). 
30. https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/189/50404-israelpalestine-
conflict-interview-with-richard-falk.html?itemid=id. 
31. Interview with Richard Falk, available at 
https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/189/50404-israelpalestine-
conflict-interview-with-richard-falk.html?itemid=id. 
32. A/67/379, September 2012, “Report of the Special Rapporteur Richard Falk on the 
situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967” 
(https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N12/515/86/PDF/N1251586.pdf?OpenElement). 
33. https://truthout.org/articles/interview-with-un-special-rapporteur-richard-falk-legitimacy-
is-the-agency-of-history/. 
34. https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/189/50404-israelpalestine-
conflict-interview-with-richard-falk.html?itemid=id. 
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35. The term first used by Hedley Bull (1977) while defining “New Medievalism”.  
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